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Cooperation agreements in biotechnology allow us to observe the complexity surrounding alliances. The market 
globalization, the exorbitant costs of R&D and the rapid changes in technology, are arguably amongst the principal reasons 
that push companies to establish cooperation agreements. Biotechnology companies use this instrument to develop external 
features in the search for resources and missing expertise. This paper sets out to identify if such cooperation agreements in 
biotechnology companies are an advantage in themselves, sufficient for the acquisition of new capabilities and if they help 
the growth of these companies. For this approach, a private database of companies in the two most advanced countries in 






The chemical industry, considered as the first to have had a 
scientific base, constitutes a very heterogeneous sector. 
Molecular biology is complemented by the chemical 
industry in its steps towards the conquest of the molecular 
world. We could even say that the marriage of these two 
sciences, which formed the young biotechnology sector, is 
indivisible. In addition, the birth of the large multinational 
companies that work today in biotechnology is the result of 
companies that developed since the 1920s. They were 
restructured while being interested in the always-promising 
sectors of pharmacy and agrochemicals. These two sectors 
form oligopoly structures in an environment of very high 
competition. In these industries, the R&D department is the 
primary component of importance, and the costs to 
complete an innovating product are often very high. For 
example, it will necessarily take from ten to twelve years 
and 500 to 800 million US dollars, on average, for a new 
drug to be made available on the market, included in these 
figures are the opportunity costs of development 
(Sachwald, 1994; Drew, 1999; DiMasi, 2001). 
 
This article has a double profile. The first one implies the 
ambiguity in reason of a complex causal structural 
industrial cooperation (asymmetric differences), while the 
second profile involves a small number of studies made on 
the relationship between cooperation agreements, 
advantages and performance (taken in the broad sense: 
profitability, but also growth, stability, etc). 
 
First, the methodology and hypothesis used in this work 
will be described. Secondly, a literature review regarding 
the theoretical aspects and forms of cooperation agreements 
will be presented. Thirdly, the way in which these alliances 
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contribute to the strategic aims of the partners and the way 
biotechnology firms cooperate will be decribed. Finally, the 
article finishes showing the results obtained through this 
research and conclusions are drawn suggesting that 
alliances by itself do not explain nor justify the pace of 
growth of emerging biotechnology companies . Within this 
scenario, the question that we will try to answer is: Why 
biotechnology managers choose collaborations instead of 
other possibilities? In addition, we want to know, what are 
the advantages and the disadvantages that the managers can 
encounter while engaging in this mode of agreements (does 
this practice really increase the company’s knowledge, 
open the door to intellectual property, make easier access to 
venture capital and ensure growth?).? 
 
We created a database of 900 biotechnology companies 
(from more than 3500 biotechnology companies in the 
world) with and without alliances in the United States and 
United Kingdom. We selected these countries because they 
are the leaders in this sector, not only by the number of 
companies, but also by their quality. We will analyze if the 
biotechnology companies with cooperation agreements 
develop an advantage in the acquisition of new capabilities, 
in relation to social capital, intellectual property, venture 
capital and finally, in which sector they are more active 




We used secondary information to create an original and 
exclusive database of biotechnology companies from the 
United States and the United Kingdom for the period 1996-
2001. SPSS statistical software was used to analyze the data 
for regressions and correlations. Because several growth 
promoters are involved in the success or failure of  
biotechnology companies, we used different dependent and 
independent variables. The dependent variable was the fast 
growth of the companies, which was measured by the 
increase of 50% or more in the number of employees 
during the period 1996 to 2001. We use the number of 
employees because we work with private and public 
companies. We cannot use the income data from private 
companies, because for private companies that information 
is not publicly availabe. The independent variables were 
treated in a metric approach (for example the age of the 
companies) or dichotomy form by yes/no (supply/absence 
of alliances). The variables were: the age of the company 
(variable metric calculated over a number of years since the 
foundation), area of exploitation, such a human health or 
agro/bio (dichotomy yes/no), patents (yes/no), venture 
capital (yes/no) and finally, alliances (yes/no). 
 
These factors influence the behaviour of the companies at a 
point in time, such as now, and they show very different 
performances in an environment of similar characteristics. 
The literature shows that the companies do not have the 
same characteristics, nor the same competences or routines; 
the companies generate a variety of different capabilities, as 
if each one of them were equipped with limited rationality 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). The companies do not have 
identical resources and they do not react in the same way 
either to same internal or external stimuli, which results in 
certain companies growing much more quickly than others 
(Azoulay and Weinstein, 2000). This complexity 





Technological and commercial alliances between 
specialized biotechnology companies (SBC) and large 
companies (generally multinationals) are not sufficient to 
support the fast growth of the SBC. We assume that the 
cooperation by itself does not explain the fast growth or the 
acquisition of capabilities in biotechnology companies. 
Circumstances place the large companies and the SBC in a 
kind of constant interdependence in the search for expertise, 
resources and knowledge. This situation shows that 
cooperation is a route almost forced upon the SBC. 
Alliances can provide financial resources and 
complementary capabilities to the specialized companies in 
biotechnology (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). These 
resources can be crystallized in activities like R&D, 
marketing, manufacture, distribution, protection and 
defence of the intellectual property as well as approval 
systems by national organizations (like the FDA in the 
United States). However, the SBC needs more than a 
simple cooperation agreement for growth. They need a 
virtuous circle with the interaction of all factors such as 
venture capital, intellectual property and knowledge. 
 
The Theoretical Aspects 
 
For several years, cooperation agreements between 
independent companies have not ceased to multiply, in 
order to start R&D programs, production scheduling or for 
the marketing of technological products (Lewis, 1990; 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Combe, 1996; Gulati, 
1998). The explanations, which we find in the literature, 
that justify the existence of such cooperation agreements, 
are numerous and sometimes ambiguous. Several authors 
simply say that economic globalization is partly responsible 
for the growth of cooperation between companies (Lewis, 
1990; Hagedoorn, 1993; Policet and Noel, 1994; Yoshino 
and Rangan, 1995; Dussauge, and Garrette, 1995; 1999; 
Doz, 1996; Gulati, 1998; 1999). Also, this technological 
environment is in constant transformation and the speed of 
change is very fast (Pisano and Mang, 1993). 
 
The term “cooperation”, as Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and 
Ingham Mothe (2000) explain, generates very 
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heterogeneous realities. This concept is sometimes unclear, 
because it is employed to express all the contractual forms, 
such as joint ventures, consortia, licences, distribution and 
R&D agreements, etc. The definition of alliance and 
cooperation are relatively vague, but also rich and 
evolutionary (Bouayad, 1996). In fact, to define 
cooperation or alliance is a complex task. This is due to the 
ambiguity of the terms and the generic use made of these 
concepts that cover innumerable possibilities (“coalition”, 
“partnership”, “agreement”, “cooperation between firms”, 
“joint ventures”, etc). Economic and management scholars 
have contributed partly to this confusion, from the great 
quantity of definitions and classifications that they have 
produced (Combe, 1995). In the same way, the concepts of 
cooperation or alliance are often ambivalent (Dussauge and 
Garrette, 1999). The expression “cooperation” relates to the 
relations established in a durable way to divide limited 
resources, without putting in jeopardy the autonomy of the 
partners. In addition, the duration of alliance, according to 
several authors, is more often of a strategic nature (Aliouat, 
1996). Alliances are contractual, formal cooperation 
agreements, as opposed to the multiple informal forms of 
cooperation. The definitions that follow show the diversity 
of concepts. Combe (1995) defines alliance as an 
association of a formal or informal character, between two 
or several concurrent companies (or potentially 
competitors) or complementary, with or without financial 
participation. The allied companies try to rather develop, 
produce or market goods by sharing their competences 
rather than resorting to the commercial contract whose 
range is limited to the short term or total integration, 
marked by the disappearance of an entity. This concept 
coincides with that proposed by Jolly (1995). The author 
adds that the acquisition of unilateral grant of licenses, 
research under contract or total fusions are operations that 
escape to the alliance. For Gulati (1999) strategic alliances 
are voluntary cooperation agreements that imply exchanges, 
division or co-development and which can include 
contributions such as financing, technology or specific 
goods. 
 
The growth of high technology companies, based on 
knowledge, plays a very important role in the development 
of the agreement. However, this role can be played in 
various ways. Either the companies choose internal 
development (independent), or they prefer external growth 
(hierarchical or cooperative). In this paper, we will focus on 
external growth, particularly the option of cooperation in 
high technology industry1. 
 
                                                 
1Through the word "high technology", which is rather vague in its 
definition, we want to refer to biotechnology basically, but also to 
advanced materials and electronics. For more details to see OECD, codes 
CAB (http://www.oecd.org). 
 
The alliance strategy can be useful, as Niosi (1994, 2003) 
explains, for limiting (and controlling) the growing costs of 
internal development (R&D) of high technology. In 
addition, alliance can help the partners to rise in the market 
hierarchy (Hagedoorn, 1995; Aliouat, 1996). However, 
Jacquemin and Remiche (1988) illustrate the difficulty in 
classifying technological alliances, because they are 
intermediate forms of organization between the hierarchies 
and the markets. 
 
Knowledge shearing has a crucial role in cooperations 
(Badaracco, 1991). In such situations, each partner 
contributes with a part of his resources and competencies 
(technology, equipment, financing, know-how, etc). In 
response to this contribution, the partners will seek to 
benefit from the results, which can be shared, or not, in the 
intellectual property or any other forms of advantage 
considered in the agreement (Niosi, 1994). The knowledge, 
is created during the alliance (Badaracco, 1991, Inkpen, 
1996, Doz, 1996, Doz and Hamel, 1998, Ingham and 
Mothe, 2000) as a result of the collective learning generated 
by the partners during the cooperation agreement. The more 
the agreement is long-term, dynamic and interactive, the 
more the possibilities of learning and accumulation of 
knowledge will increase for the partners. 
 
The Alliance Management 
 
Before approaching the modes of alliance management, it is 
interesting to note a series of recommendations being used 
for the development and negotiation of what Gaudin (1988) 
calls, a “reciprocal charter of rights and obligations” in 
cooperation. This critical charter can be used as the base for 
better negotiating the agreement. The charter should 
include program objectives; agreement duration; the 
implement choice; clarification of mutual interest; 
instruments of direction, execution and control of the 
agreement; rules or principles of exploitation and how to 
protect results; and finally, the liquidation of the 
cooperation agreement. 
 
In taking into account these elements and stipulating the 
measurements and objectives most simply and clearly, the 
cooperation management agreement should obviously be 
facilitated (Killing, 1988). Thus, the strategies of a manager 
will depend on the partner objectives, the time of the 
alliance, the type of technology to be exploited and the 
market to be used. It would also be necessary to consider 
the characteristics of each manager, because there are not 
two managers who will react in an identical way when 
facing the same constraint (Nelson, 1994; Williams, 1994; 
Carroll, 1994). In addition, it is important to consider 
environmental uncertainty in management. This 
contingency can be caused by a request of technology, by 
the preferences of the customer, the actions of the 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org)                                                                                               
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT & INNOVATION © UNIVERSIDAD DE TALCA 
 9
competitors, the governmental policies, and the suppliers’ 
capabilities, but also by the potential partners. 
 
How partners are organized to work with each other, is one 
of the keys for successful cooperation, (Loranger and Roos, 
1992). A manager that is a skilful alliance manager is able 
to face the problems and to overcome the difficulties more 
easily. We refer here to the difficulties of the social 
environment (language, culture), the other partners, and 
legal framework (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). However, it 
is necessary that the objectives of the allies are as 
complementary and explicit as possible. It is essential also 
to establish a joint data carrier and that the process is as 
interactive as possible (Lorange and Roos, 1992). Thus, the 
alliance success will depend of the experience, quality, and 
the manager’s talent (Woiceshyn and Hartel, 1996). 
 
The alliance management is not an easy task given the 
multiplicity of the constraints that they produce. Managers 
must compose, within the existing legislation, the structures 
of the market in which the alliance evolves or with the 
existing capacities of communication (AECEC, 1992). The 
size of the partners (asymmetric influence) is another 
characteristic that should be considered because the input 
met by the multinational corporation in alliances should not 
be necessarily the same that of an SBC. In addition, the 
modes of alliance management will change according to 
whether they are national or international, high-tech or 
mature technology, formal or informal, as much as their 
goals, sometimes which present divergent characteristics 
(Niosi, 1994). In fact, the modes of alliance management 
should normally be specific to the culture of the companies 
that begin in the cooperation. Moreover, in any agreement, 
it will be necessary also to consider the management of the 
intellectual property that will result from this cooperation 
agreement (Lerner and Merges, 1997). Another important 
point is the degree of opportunism shown by one or both 
partners expressed during the cooperation agreement 
(Axelrod, 1984). 
 
The cooperation agreement is a learning organization and 
represents a source of know-how advantage that depends on 
the basic intangible knowledge of its members (Moingeon 
and Ramanantsoa, 1995; Nonaka et al., 1996). Thus, 
learning is the only way to survive within cooperation, but 
also to obtain a differential growth. The organizational 
learning takes place in a process of social interaction 
through which an accumulation of knowledge occurs 
(organizational or not), which can contain knowledge or 
know-how (Ingham and Mothe, 2000). Knowledge is an 
abstract concept, which is built consciously or 
unconsciously by the interpretation of a group of 
information acquired through experience and meditation in 
the practice, which could give to its owner a mental and/or 
physical skill in its art (Albino et al., 1999). These authors 
argue that, from a structural point of view, knowledge is 
build by the information produced by the persons within the 
organizations. In their turn, the organizations are used as 
support or, they offer the context so that the process of 
knowledge founding takes place thanks to the interaction of 
the community. The creation of knowledge must thus be a 
construction in constant interaction (Nonaka et al., 1996). 
This opinion is divided by Inkpen (1996) who argues that 
the generation of new knowledge is based on the 
capabilities of transformation deployed by the managers. 
They are responsible for setting up the conditions of change 
necessary for the absorption or the assimilation of all new 
knowledge. This assimilation represents a process of 
learning accumulation of their individual skills, as well as 
the routines belonging to each organization are made 
profitable by the cooperative project (Albino et al., 1999). 
 
The Alliances of Biotechnology companies 
 
Biotechnology is a technological process founded on 
knowledge and can be defined as the application of science 
and engineering to the methods, processes and techniques 
(referred to as recombination of the DNA to, and/or within 
biological systems. This definition includes recombination 
of the DNA, cellular fusion and its related techniques, as 
well as the advanced techniques like the bioprocess 
engineering. All these techniques applied directly or 
indirectly to micro organisms, humans, animal or vegetable 
cells or parts of these, can facilitate the development and 
produce new molecules and cells, new organisms and 
procedures to improve in an innovative way those which 
already exist. In this context, university researchers 
(molecular biologists, medical doctors, as well as genetic 
and chemical engineers) dominate the general concepts 
surrounding molecular biology. However, these same 
scientists have neither the skills of management to organize 
companies, nor financing skill to market their products and 
this is why they are often constrained to search the partners 
for a cooperation agreement (Powell et al., 1996). 
 
The approach between the specialized biotechnology 
companies and the large companies begin usually with a 
research contract, information exchange or simply 
consultation. Then, if the circumstances are favourable, the 
companies will be able to think of constituting partnerships 
that are much more formal. These alliances are often 
cemented, partly through to the support of governments. 
Being given the importance attached to biotechnology, the 
governments of the industrialized countries encourage 
universities and their researchers to patent and market the 
know-how of their products (OECD, 1987). 
 
Alliances in biotechnology are different from alliances in 
other technologies. For example, biotechnology is unable to 
produce prototypes; it must, contrary to the other sectors, 
face the uncertainty of living organisms, with the ethics and 
the danger of environmental contamination. The product 
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development in biotechnology is generally longer, more 
complex, and with higher uncertainty, and in the case of  
products regarding human lealth, pre-clinical and clinical 
phases need to be taken into account. We can consider 
quasi-immediate outputs from others high-tech products 
like software, contrary to the biotechnology, whose return 
on the investments requires several years (Woiceshyn and 
Hartel, 1996). The legal aspect of biotechnology processes 
is expensive, complex and slow, contrary to technology 
information for example (Powell et al., 1996). Thus, 
uncertainty related to the market is omnipresent. 
 
The objective of strategic alliances between the large 
companies (generally pharmaceutical) and the specialized 
biotechnology companies (SBC), is to obtain an advantage 
for the acquisition of new capabilities, which are very 
expensive or impossible to obtain inside, or which would 
take too much time to reproduce inside the company. There 
is a kind of information exchange (Botkin and Matthews, 
1995) that is possible only if each company agrees to lose a 
certain degree of autonomy. Thus, the SBC will lose a few 
advantages, especially at the decisional level, in order to 
gain other advantages. These advantages can be represented 
in the SBC by the access to financing, laboratory 
equipments, large international markets, or by the 
admission to certain markets whose cultural barriers are 
difficult to cross, as can be the case of Japan or China 
(Barley et al., 1992). 
 
Biotechnology Cooperation Agreements 
 
The high costs of biotechnology R&D, the long duration of 
clinical trials, as well as the expenditure of marketing and 
product commercialization, exceed the financial 
possibilities of the small-specialized biotechnology 
companies. To fill this gap, these companies must sign 
agreements of cooperation with large companies. These 
alliances not only provide new sources of financing for the 
R&D, but they also make possible the participation of 
various team members to diversify and reduce uncertainties 
inherent to the development of new products. 
 
In general, cooperation agreements between small and large 
companies materialize to combine complementary 
competences and resources. In this direction, the gaps of the 
small companies are related to industrial R&D, 
manufacturing, marketing, obtaining patents and accelerate 
the governmental approval of products (Baum et al., 2000; 
Statistics Canada, 2000; Bas and Niosi, 2006). The 
pharmaceutical companies research new innovating 
products to fill their pipeline. The sectors where the large 
companies take part in agreements with smaller companies 
are often the pharmaceutical, agro/bio, and chemical sector 
(Shan et al., 1994). 
 
Generally, the SBC will establish alliances with: 
- Multinationals Pharmaceuticals Companies: By the 
experience, the potential to increase the probability to 
patent and exportation, the financial capacity, the 
distribution networks, and the skill in R&D. 
- Universities: By the intellectual capital and the 
equipment of laboratories. 
- Governmental laboratories: By the high capabilities in 
R&D and financials contacts. 
 
Forrest and Martin (1992) analyze also the principal 
reasons that lead the companies to establish cooperation 
agreements in biotechnology. According to these authors, 
the allies seek mainly: 
- The possibility of fast technology exploitation; 
- The medium-term incomes generation; 
- The risk and uncertainties partition in the new products 
development; 
- The access to the financing, otherwise very difficult; 
- Credibility; 
- Expertise in R&D, which the partner has. 
 
The large companies often looking for agreement with 
SBC, when certain competences are dificult to obtain in the 
large corporations, and the goal is to increase the number of 
products in their pipeline (Forrest and Martin, 1992). In 
addition, many competences (in particular in biology, 
genetics, and proteomic) of the large companies do not 
exist in the small ones. The large companies thus prefer to 
join the small ones, rather than with other great 
multinationals (Martin and Forrest, 1994) in order to 
preserve their options on new technology. 
 
For a few years, biotechnology has been one of the high-
tech sectors having one of the fastest growth in the world. 
According to a study published in 2000 by Industry 
Canada, this expansion was four times more quickly than 
the average of the economy in general. The fast growth of 
the biotechnology companies has been very high, but on the 
other hand, it is limited to a very restricted number of 
companies (Niosi and Bas, 2001; Bas and Niosi, 2006). 
Small companies (80% of total) compose the biotechnology 
sector and usually they are very young (less of ten years) 
(Industry Canada, 2000). Moreover, the companies of this 
size are very innovating (Stephan and Everhart, 1998; 
Audretsch, 2001) and generally well equipped with 
intellectual resources. The theory of the resources of the 
company and the theory of the competences postulate that 
the internal capabilities have a direct effect on the growth 
of the companies (Penrose, 1959; Hamel and Prahalad, 
1993; Foss, 1997; 2000). 
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We evaluate the dimension and the dynamics of this 
technology and we have a good description of the stakes 
with the biotechnology companies are confronted in 
general. Table 1 and Table 2 present a brief summary of 
current biotechnology situation for the principal countries 
working in this sector. The first table shows how the United 
States dominates largely all plans. First, their prevalence 
appears by the number of biotechnology companies, bench 
at 1,457 companies, follow-up far by the United Kingdom 
with 395 companies and Canada with 391. Germany arrives 
in fourth place with 365 companies, but that is due to the 
youth and very small size of its companies. With regard to 
the public companies (quoted on the stock exchange), once 
again the United States is at the lead, with 339 companies; 
Canada occupies this time the second place with 89 
companies and the United Kingdom is third with 48 
companies. In addition the United States biotechnology 
companies dominate largely over the incomes plan, with 
31,749 million US$, followed by far by the United 
Kingdom with 3,323 million US$ and Canada by 2,893 
million US$. In addition, the reduced number of companies 
of other countries, the income achieve by there is more 
limited. This table clearly shows the uncontested leadership 
of the United States, follow-up by the United Kingdom and 
Canada. These three countries dominate jointly, with 
Germany that appears on the horizon like the fourth future 
world force. 
 
Table 1: The State of the Biotechnology in the World in 2002 (the incomes are in millions US$)  
 
 USA UK Canada Germany France Japan 
Incomes from 
Biotechnology 
31,749 3,323 2,893 1,190 859 N/A 
Number of Public 
companies 
339 48 89 20 8 2 
Number of Private 
companies 
1,118 347 302 N/A N/A N/A 
Total Number of 
companies 
1,457 395 391 365 240 271 
Source : Statistics Canada (2003) 
 
Table 2 shows a particularity, because 70% of the Canadian 
SBC belongs to the human health sector, whereas this 
number is 56% in USA and 50% in UK. These statistics 
illustrate the human health like the more represented 
segment compares to another sector like agro/bio or 
environment. As explained previously, cooperation 
agreement between SBC and large pharmaceutical 
companies can play an important role for benefiting the 
human health in detriment of another biotechnology 
sectors. Also, the lack of ethical problems or public 
approval, as it is the case of agro/bio in Europe, plays an 
outstanding role. Another interesting element to emphasize 
is the numbers of revenues generated by the SBC, those that 
are dominated by the USA with 31,000 millions US$ 
followed by UK with 3,300 millions US$ and Canada with 
2,800 millions US$. The expenses in R&D show the 
interest of these countries to this particular technology. The 
model shows the USA like a comfortable leader in R&D 
investment with 15,700 million US$, followed far behind 
by UK with 2,000 million US$ and Canada with 1,000 
million US$. Another key factor when we considered the 
development of the biotechnology companies is the Venture 
Capital, whose investment is dominated once again by the 
USA with 1,330 million US$, followed by UK with 564 
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Table 2: The Specialized Biotechnology companies (SBC) in the USA, Canada and U-K in 2000-2001 
 
 USA Canada UK 
SBC in Human Health (%) 56% 70% 50% 
SBC Total Revenues (mill. US$) 31,000 mill. US$ 2,800 mill. US$ 3,300 mill. US$ 
SBC Total R&D Expenditures 15,700 mill. US$ 1,000 mill. US$ 2,000 mill. US$ 
Venture Capital Invested in SBC 1,330 mill. US$ 488 mill. US$ 564 mill. US$ 
 
Sources: KPMG; BIO.org; Ernst &Young; British Information Services. 
 
 
United States Correlation and Logistical 
Regression 
 
Starting from data obtained of the random sample, we 
proceeded to make a linear correlation (Pearson) (Table 3).  
The correlations show multi co-linearity between particular 
variables like venture capital, patents, human health sector 
and alliances.  This fact is simple to explain, because 
companies that establish alliances, obtained patent from 
their inventions, operate in human health sector, and 
obtained venture capital, are those that presented a fast 
growth.  However, they are strongly correlated and we are 
in presence of multi co-linearity.  This phenomenon appears 
in the correlations between the variables venture capital and 
patents, with a correlation of 0.363; the variables alliances 
and patents have a correlation of 0.363; alliances and 
human health present a correlation of 0.423 and finally, 
between the variables alliances and venture capital the 
correlation is 0.344.  Considering this very strong co 
linearity, we must choose a variable that best explains both 
the fast growth of the companies and their stagnation.  The 
venture capital showed the best estimate to explain the fast 
growth of the companies, with a correlation of 0.445, 
whereas the alliances shown the meagre estimation with 
0.109  i.e. Americans companies which had access to the 
venture capital more often presented a stronger growth in 
comparison with those whose access to this type of 
financing was restricted or null. In addition, as presented in 
Table 3, most of the companies can see return in a kind of 
"growth virtuous circle".  The companies belonging to this 
circle are: in human health sector, have patents in America , 
obtained venture capital, and have established long-term 
alliances with industrial partners. 
 
Table 4 show the impact and the importance to be involved 
in others areas rather than human health, because other 
sectors were in stagnation or at best, had a very slow 
growth. Thus, our logistic regression cannot explain large 
growth and stagnation by only one variable, alliance 
(60.9%). To obtain better results is necessary to employ 
other independent variables (venture capital, patents and 
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**The correlation is significant at 0.01 and we have a multi co linearity with the variables. 
 
*The correlation is significant at 0.05 
 
Table 4 Logistical Regression of US companies with the independent variable: Alliance 
 
Case in study = 137. Dependant Variable : Fast Growth (Yes/No) 
                                     Independent Variable : Alliance (Yes/No) 
 
 
Omnibus test of model 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 1.641 1 .200 
Block 1.641 1 .200 
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Step -2 Log likehood Cox & Snell R-square Nagelkerke R-square 




VD Fast Growth Observed 
1 (No) 2 (Yes) 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 VD Growth       1 (No) 34 34 50.0 
                                     2 (Yes) 27 42 60.9 
Overall Percentage  55.5 
 
Variables in the equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp. (b) 
Alliance .442 .346 1.631 1 .202 1.556 
Constant -.672 .565 1.417 1 .234 .511 
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United Kingdom Correlation and Logistical 
Regression 
 
Starting from data obtained for United Kingdom random 
sample, we proceeded to make a linear correlation 
(Pearson), which is presented in Table 5.  It shows the 
independent variables being able to influence the dependent 
variable (VD) (fast growth of the UK biotechnology 
companies).  We used the same approach as in the case of 
the United States by correlating the independent variables, 
i.e. patents, human health, venture capital and alliances, 
between them and with the dependent variable (called VD 
growth) in order to control the co-linearity. 
 
We can observe in Table 5 that the companies in the United 
Kingdom have very strong co-linearity between ranges of 
variables. This situation is independent of the phenomenon 
of multi co-linearity and easily observable in the 
correlations between alliances and venture capital with 
0.600; human health and venture capital, 0.413; human 
health and alliances with a correlation of 0.564; patents and 
venture capital 0.531; patents and alliances 0.529 and 
finally, patents and human health with a correlation of 
0.617.  As in the case of the matrix correlation of the 
United States, we confronted the same decision as for the 
variable explaining the differential growth of the UK 
companies.  The correlation shows that the independent 
variable "Patent" explains best the fast growth of the 
companies because it is most strongly dependent with a 
correlation of 0.398.  The British companies with American 
patents had a stronger growth than those which do not have. 
The correlation between the independent variable alliance 
with the dependent variable Growth showed a score of 
0.285. However, more important still, we can look that the 
alliances by itself cannot explain the growth of the 
biotechnology companies. To explain that we need the 
virtuous circle with the other variables (venture capital, 
alliances, human health) to take an active part in the 
process.  These data confirm the assumptions predicting the 
importance to work in interaction with a virtuous circle and 
their factors. 
 
We chose to regress the dependent variable with alliance – 
the variable that yielded the best estimate. 79.2% of 
companies that growth established a cooperation agreement 
(Table 6). The other independent variables – venture capital 
or patents – yielded somewhat similar decisive results. 
 
Table 5 United Kingdom Correlation 
 
  VD 
Growth 
Patents H. Health Alliances Venture 
capital 
Age 
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Table 6 Logistical Regression of UK companies with the independent variable: Alliance 
 
Cases in study = 49. Dependent Variable : Fast Growth (Yes/No) 
                              Independent Variable : Alliance (Yes/No) 
 
Omnibus Test of model 
 Chi Square df Sig. 
Step 1 4.081 1 .043 
Block 4.081 1 .043 
Model 4.081 1 .043 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likehood Cox & Snell R-square Nagelkerke R-square 




VD Fast Growth Observed 
1 (No) 2 (Yes) 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 VD Fast Growth       1 (No) 12 13 48.0 
                                             2 (Yes) 5 19 79.2 
Overall Percentage  63.3 
 
Variables in the equation 
 B S.E. Wald DF Sig Exp. (b) 
Alliance 1.255 .643 3.814 1 .051 3.508 
Constant -2.130 1.124 3.594 1 .058 .119 
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The extensive work done from 1980 in biotechnology 
companies management and particularly on the alliances, 
have tried to present these like the central axis of the 
growth of biotechnology companies. Although the 
cooperation agreements are extremely important in the 
search of missing competencies and resources (access to 
capital, distribution chains, asymmetrical reduction, greater 
and better protection of the intellectual property, etc.), we 
could also say that the alliances by itself do not explain and 
nor justify the fast growth of many biotechnology 
companies. The alliances are very important for the 
acquisition of capabilities, knowledge and resources, but 
this is only one player in a portrait that we could describe as 
"typical" in biotechnology, which is observable in the 
virtuous circle growth of the companies.  The companies 
that make experimental research in human health, usually 
protect their inventions by patents, can attract venture 
capital or any other form of financing, will growth more 
quickly and better than others. This strategy may open the 
doors to potential cooperation agreements.  A good patent 
(for example obtained in the United States) also grants 
prestige for the company.  This can draw the attention of 
the large pharmaceutical companies in search of 
competences of the SBC and seem for establishes alliances.  
The power of all these factors under the umbrella of the 
"virtuous circle" will be positioning favourably the SBC to 
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